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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the applicability of real estate
investment trusts (REITs) to the Japanese real estate capital
markets at present.
In the fully diversified financial markets in the U.S.,
the real estate capital markets are an important element and
have succeeded in diversifying their fund-raising resources.
The real estate capital markets there have established a
bridge to the securities markets through securitization.
In Japan, on the other hand, there have been no
successful efforts to date to create a bridge between the real
estate and other capital markets, although the need to have
such a bridge is perceived. Fund-raising for the real estate
business in Japan depends largely on bank loans because of the
reliable bank loan markets at the moment and less-developed
securities markets.
REITs are financial instruments created by Congress to
provide an investment opportunity in real estate for small
investors in the U.S. capital markets. While REITs showed a
resurgence from the most recent recession by changing their
asset composition, they still present such risks as price
volatility.
From the standpoints of interested parties in Japan, the
need to introduce REITs themselves was not found, although
there is a clear need to develop the securities markets as a
fund resource for the real estate business. Additionally, it
seems rather difficult to develop the present security
investment trusts (SITs) in Japan into potential REITs because
of fundamental differences between SITs and REITs.
Finally, the author concluded that the applicability of
REITs to present-day Japanese real estate capital markets is
low, although the need for these markets to create some sort
4of bridge to other capital markets is perceived.
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6INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the applicability of Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs) to Japanese real estate capital
markets as one form of introducing securitization.
By way of background, Japanese real estate capital
markets have long been marking time with minimal innovations
having been introduced. Recent enthusiasm for real estate
development, however, has provoked intense discussion
concerning real estate financing and, in particular, the use
of some form of securitization. For example, Japan National
Railways (JNR) is proposing to issue mortgage-backed
securities to fund the future development of their extensive
land holdings.
Looking at the United States, there has been an
established history of securitization in real estate
financing. As one example, Congress legislated REITs in 1960
to allow investors corporate type ownership of real estate
without double taxation. Assets in the REIT industry expanded
rapidly from just $1 billion in 1968 to a peak of $20.5
billion in 1974. Subsequently, however, mortgage REITs were
profoundly affected by the increase of interest rates in the
mid-1970's, and many of them collapsed, with the total assets
of the industry reduced to $12.0 billion in 1975. Learning
from this experience, the REIT industry changed the
composition of its assets and began to see a resurgence of
popularity, with total assets amounting to $23.7 billion in
71986 [821. That REITs are a strong and viable force in U.S.
capital markets can be seen from that fact that, while the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 badly affected real estate investment as a
whole, REITs were able to turn the provisions of this act to
their advantage and emerge even healthier than before. In
fact, the share price index of REITs as reported by the
National Real Estate Association (NAREIT) in 1986, at $113.47,
was the highest since 1972.
It is the author's contention that the applicability of
REITs to Japanese real estate capital markets is subject to
question, and, in fact, that the chances for a transfer of
such instruments is low. On the other hand, there is a need
to integrate Japanese real estate capital markets with the
stock and bond markets and perhaps introduce some form of
securitization that is suitable for the culture of the
Japanese banking system.
A. Organization and Methodology
The basic framework of this article is a comparative
examination of the U.S. and Japanese real estate capital
markets.
The examination of the U.S. real estate capital markets
in Chapter I includes an overview of the structure of the
financial markets and an examination of the capital and real
estate capital markets. The position of the real estate
capital markets within the larger markets and the sources of
capital for real estate investment are especially highlighted.
8Through this process, the issue of securitization will be
addressed.
In Chapter II, the Japanese real estate capital markets
are examined and compared with their U.S. counterparts. By
investigating the differences and similarities between the
two, we may generate an initial assessment of the feasibility
of securitization in Japan.
Chapter III addresses the U.S. experience with REITs.
The reasons why REITs emerged, declined and/or developed in
the U.S. as well as the characteristics, history and
performance of REITs are closely reviewed.
Finally, in Chapter IV, the applicability of REITs to the
Japanese real estate capital markets is discussed. The
Japanese situation is described and analyzed from the
standpoint of the requisite elements for the application of
REITs, including the necessity for and potential benefit of
adopting REITs. After sifting through the conditions
necessary for such an adoption, the virtues and risks of
REITs' applicability are weighted.
B. Basic Terminology
Before entering into the body of this paper, the author
would like to detail the terminology used in this thesis.
Financial markets in the original sense are "places where
assets and liabilities are traded" [62]. Functionally, these
financial markets are divided into the Private Financial
Market and the Intermediation Financial Market (Exhibit 1).
EXHIBIT 1 9
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In the Private Financial Market, funds flow from Surplus
Spending Units (SSUs) to Deficit Spending Units (DSUs) either
directly or indirectly through the aid of a broker or a
dealer. In the Intermediation Financial Market, on the other
hand, funds are transferred from SSUs to DSUs through
financial intermediaries [501 (1221.
The main difference between the two lies in the type of
claims connecting the parties. Claims in the Private
Financial Market are primary claims only. The broker or
dealer does not affect the characteristics of the claim at
all. But the broker or the dealer may also be an underwriter
in most cases, and the underwriters determine the
characteristics of the claim. Claims in the Intermediation
Financial Market, on the other hand, include primary and
secondary claims, and the financial intermediaries influence
the direct relation between SSUs and DSUs. This basic
classification is applicable to both the U.S. and Japanese
financial markets.
Financial markets are further divided into money markets
and capital markets. The former treats instruments of less
than one year's duration and the latter those of more than one
year. This thesis will concentrate on capital markets, as the
focus of real estate finance is long-term capital needs.
Securitization can be defined as the process by which
illiquid financial assets and liabilities are transformed into
capital market instruments. For example, real estate assets
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or mortgage debts are transformed into mortgage-backed
securities which are circulated in the capital markets.
Finally, the term disintermediation refers to a situation
in which deposits are removed from a financial intermediary,
such as a savings and loan association, and invested in other
assets, generally for the purpose of obtaining higher yields.
12
CHAPTER I
U.S. REAL ESTATE CAPITAL MARKETS
A. U.S. Financial Markets
Exhibit 2 shows the framework of the U.S. financial
markets as a system. Under the multiple bank regulatory
bodies, there are nationwide nondepository institutions and
regional depository institutions.
1. One of the features of this framework is the
separation of investment banking from commercial banking and
other depository institutions, as stipulated in the Banking
Act of 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act. This act was promulgated
to restore confidence in the commercial banking system, which
had been severely damaged by the Depression [50]. At present,
this separation is meeting with a fair amount of harsh
criticism, and it appears that this situation may change in
the near future.
2. The Intermediation Financial Market in the U.S. is
founded on the dualistic (federal and state) system of
chartering, organization and regulation [14]. Based on the
establishment of the National Bank Act of 1864, this system
has a long tradition in the U.S. and is zealously protected by
the banking industry [501 (1121. Under this dualistic system,
strict geographical limitations are placed on depository
institutions.
3. Partially as a result of the dualistic system, a
characteristic of financial regulation in the U.S. is its
EXHIBIT 2
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U.S.Financial System
Federal Reserve System
Federal Reserve Board : 12 regional banks
Depository Institutions (Regionally based)
Commercial Banks
National Chartered Banks
State Chartered Banks
Foreign Banks
Mutual Saving Banks
Savings and Loan Associations
Credit Unions
Non-Bank Banks
Non-Depository Institutions
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Pension Funds
Open End Investment Companies
Bank Regulatory Bodies
Federal Reserve Board
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
Federal Asset Disposition Agency (FADA)
Comptroller of the Currency
State Bank Regulators
(Source: M.A.Louargand)
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multiplicity (141. Not only do federal level regulations
apply; state level regulations also exist. Further, at both
the federal and state levels, there is a multiplicity of
regulators. The most important of these at the federal level
are the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the National Credit
Union Administration, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (141.
4. As the multiplicity of regulators would indicate,
there are many financial institutions in the U.S. As of 1983,
for example, private depository institutions alone included
15,400 banks, 3,513 savings and loan associations, 534 mutual
savings banks and 19,203 credit unions. And these numbers do
not even include nondepository financial institutions (141
[1111. The existence of so many financial institutions means
that the financial industry is minutely divided and each
institution specializes in its own line of business.
5. From the above, it can be said that the U.S. financial
markets are based on specialized financial institutions. The
separation of investment from commercial banking, and the
regional limitations placed on depository institutions are
clear examples of this. Additionally, this specialized form
of business requires a multiplicity of regulations.
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B. U.S. Capital Markets
The volume of the U.S. capital markets is shown in
Exhibit 3. The markets are divided into debt and equity. It
is noteworthy that the debt total (45% of total asset
outstandings) and the equity total (55%) are almost balanced.
These figures indicate that borrowers and lenders participate
in both the Private Financial Market and the Intermediation
Financial Market to an almost equal extent at present.
In 1986, the U.S. real estate capital markets, including
the mortgage market (19.3%) and the real estate equity market
(38.7%) amounted to more than half (58.0%) of the capital
markets. Additionally, it should be noted that residential
markets, including mortgage and equity, accounted for 37.3% of
all outstandings. Thus, the real estate capital markets are
important elements in the U.S. capital markets.
C. U.S. Real Estate Capital Markets
The U.S. real estate capital markets examined in this
thesis contain four segments: the residential mortgage market,
the residential real estate equity market, the commercial
mortgage market, and the commercial real estate equity market.
1. Residential Mortgage Market
a. Market overview
The primary market is sustained by such suppliers as
savings and loan associations (S&Ls), mutual banks and
commercial banks. Mortgage companies make a number of
mortgage loans and arrange for other institutions to purchase
EXHIBIT 3
U.S. Capital Markets
(1988, Outstandings)
(Billion Dollars)
Amount
Total Debt 6,700
Share
44.7%
Mortgage
(Commercial Mortgage)
(Residential Mortgage)
Corporate Debt Issues
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Corporate Equity
Real Estate Equity
(Commercial Equity)
(Residential Equity)
Total Claims
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8,300
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5,800
15,000
19.3%
900 6.0%
2,000 13.3%
9.7%
15.7%
55.3%
16.7%
38.7%
2,200 14.7%
3,600 24.0%
100.0%
(Source: Salomon Brothers, Federal Reserve, M.A. Louargand.)
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blocks of mortgages. The expansion of the market has been
rapid. In 1986, residential mortgage outstandings amounted to
$1,700 billion, while new originations of home mortgages
totaled $442.3 billion.
The secondary market has also shown rapid development.
Among newly originated residential mortgages, 54% were
securitized in the first quarter of 1987, though only a third
of residential mortgage outstandings had been securitized
($582 billion out of $1,713 billion) [891.
b. Market development
The traditional stable relationship between regional
lenders and borrowers was brought to its knees in the 1970's.
This was primarily because of extreme fluctuations in interest
rates. For example, the rate of three-month treasury bills
ranged from 3% to 13% between 1972 and 1980. Savings
institutions, which had supplied capital through regulated
deposits, floundered in their fund-raising efforts because of
competition from higher interest instruments in the Private
Financial Market. The fact that 88% of the deposits in S&Ls
were regulated demand deposits in 1966 may indicate the
necessity of these efforts [50]. Savings institutions offered
interest-rate-sensitive depository accounts and were caught
between the high short-term depository rate and the low long-
term mortgage rate. This was the yield curve squeeze, which
caused the creation of new types of financing such as the
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM). An ARM is one way to transfer
18
the interest risk on financial institutions to the borrower.
Nonetheless, the difficulty in effecting immediate
changes of assets and liabilities for savings institutions
caused a shortage of funds, and a new financial structure in
the secondary market was mandatory. Securitization arose. As
Roulac said, "securitization had emerged to fulfill its
potential to provide a sustained, reliable source of financing
for real estate" [97].
c. Securitization of residential mortgages
In the securitization of residential mortgages, the roles
played by three agencies, namely, the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), the Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA), and the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA), are important.
Basically, FHLMC acts as a conduit for the securitization
of conventional mortgages originated by S&Ls. It purchases
these mortgages from the S&Ls and sells them in the form of
participation certificates (PCs) to investors in the capital
markets. Similarly, GNMA performs the guarantor function for
the securitization of Federal Housing Administration (FHA)-
insured and Veteran Administration (VA)-guaranteed mortgages
that are originated primarily by mortgage bankers. FNMA, as a
portfolio investor, provides a secondary market outlet for
mortgage bankers' originations of both conventional and FHA/VA
mortgages [44].
In 1981, FHLMC initiated its Guarantor Program and FNMA
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its Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) program. Under these, an
S&L would exchange its holdings of seasoned low-rate mortgage
loans with the two agencies for their guaranteed mortgage
pass-through securities. Both programs have been successful,
and, during 1982, loans amounting to more than $30 billion
were swapped into mortgage securities. On the other hand,
GNMA initiated a new program called GNMA II, which allowed
more flexible mortgage-backed securities. As a result, the
S&Ls improved the liquidity and marketability of their
mortgage-related assets.
This growth of MBS reduced geographic and institutional
barriers to the flow of funds because MBSs are traded on the
nationwide capital markets. Consequently, the housing sector
is no longer solely dependent on interest-sensitive deposit
flows to fund building activity. At the same time, the
growing demand for securities in the secondary mortgage market
has caused MBS yields to converge with those of other debt
instruments. For example, the yield differential between GNMA
pass-throughs and AAA-rated utility bonds narrowed from 50
basis points in July 1983 to parity in January 1984 [181. The
decline in MBS yields caused primary mortgage yields to be
lower than they otherwise would have been.
In short, under the strong influence of these three
agencies, securitization of residential mortgages has
continued to improve the fund-raising ability of financial
institutions such as S&Ls as well as reduce the borrower's
20
payment liability. The security provided by the real estate
capital markets, such as GNMA pass-throughs, received almost
the same evaluation from the capital markets as did the top-
rated bonds.
2. Residential Real Estate Equity Market
Residential real estate equity consists of down payments
and the accumulated equity of a house as its value
appreciates. This market has little relevance to market
development because residential real estate equity remains as
simple ownership of the property, and no devices to break up
this simple ownership are used. Thus, a close examination of
it is outside the scope of this thesis.
3. Commercial Mortgage and Equity Markets
a. Market overview
In the primary market, the major asset holders are
commercial banks, life insurance companies and savings
institutions, holding 40.2%, 26.8% and 21.6%, respectively, of
mortgage outstandings in 1986. The size of the primary
market in this segment is only half that of the residential
mortgage market.
b. Market development
The secondary commercial mortgage market is also smaller
than that of residential mortgages. Of the $800 billion of
commercial mortgage outstandings, only somewhat more than $20
billion (2.5%) had been securitized by 1986 [1221. This low
ratio reflects the difficulties involved in securitization of
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commercial real estate. This is because commercial mortgages,
as compared to residential ones, are heterogeneous in nature.
Each commercial mortgage is quite different in terms of the
collateral, mortgage period, rate and size. Because
securitization begins with pooling mortgages that are
homogeneous in terms of the above conditions, securitization
of commercial mortgages initially encountered some roadblocks.
To overcome this difficulty, buildings with similar
characteristics, such as higher cash flow or groups of
buildings, were selected in the process of securitization.
The first transaction involving commercial mortgage
securitization was in early 1984, when Salomon Brothers
structured and fractionalized a $970 million in floating rate
financing for Olympia & York (O&Y), the Canadian developer
[66]. The sum involved was about four times more than had
been raised in any previous real estate financing. The notes
issued were supported solely by the real estate values of the
properties, which were three prime Manhattan office buildings,
and were without recourse to O&Y. The notes were unrated and
initially priced at 175 basis points over the 91-day Treasury
Bill rate. It was placed privately with 40 institutional
investors.
A rating system was devised for securitization in 1984,
when Standard & Poor's (S&P) published criteria under which it
would rate nonrecourse commercial mortgage securities. Based
on these rating criteria, obtaining AA, Fisher Brothers
22
Financial Realty Company raised $160 million through the first
commercial mortgage bond collateralized by a multi-tenanted
office building in Midtown Manhattan. In this transaction,
the credit support was added by the Union Bank of Switzerland
to assure the ratings. Subsequently, O&Y again raised $200
million, with 59 Maiden Lane in the lower Manhattan financial
district as collateral. With this transaction, in addition to
the credit support, bondholders were further protected by a
liquidity reserve of approximately 25% of annual debt service
to cover the possibility of late rent payments. It is
noteworthy that these transactions reduced the cost of
funding. In 0&Y's case, it was about 60 basis points cheaper
than traditional real estate financing at the time; in
Fisher's case, 50 to 60 basis points were saved [66].
In considering the development of the commercial mortgage
market, it should be noted that there was not any shortage of
funds in the market caused by interest rate fluctuations.
This situation is quite different from the residential
mortgage market, in which a shortage of funds gave rise to
securitization. The commercial mortgage market has
traditionally been sustained by commercial banks. At times of
interest rate fluctuation, commercial banks could avoid most
difficulties by i) borrowing from federal funds, ii) drawing
Eurodollar deposits from overseas branches and/or iii) issuing
commercial paper though affiliated companies.
Clearly this situation is quite different from the
23
residential mortgage market, which, as we have mentioned, is
sustained by S&Ls. The evolution of securitization in the
commercial mortgage market derived not from the necessity to
avoid disintermediation, but from the desire of certain
borrowers to obtain cheaper and stabler funds.
The securitization of commercial real estate still
accounts for only a small proportion of new originations at
present. It seems that this is partly because securitization
in this sector did not arise from the essential requirement
that the intermediaries change the asset and liability
composition, as was the case with residential mortgages, but
because of a preference for cheaper and stabler money.
c. Commercial real estate equity market
Traditionally, the owner has supplied the equity. The
owner is, therefore, directly concerned with the management of
the real estate to protect the equity investment and usually
holds the asset for a substantial period of time in
expectation of capital appreciation along with a tax-sheltered
cash flow.
A new type of commercial real estate equity, however,
based on the avoidance of direct concern with the property,
has emerged. Real estate syndication is one example of this.
In real estate syndication, managing the real estate is the
responsibility of the general partner or developer.
Management is separated from the ownership of the syndication
shares.
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The concept of syndication is not particularly new. In
fact, mortgage bonds amounting to more than $10 billion were
sold in the 1920's, and a significant amount of real estate
syndication activity took place in New York in the 1950's.
Thus, the emergence of syndication in the 1970's and 1980's,
represents a third wave of such activity [95].
There are two types of syndication. One is the privately
offered syndication, and the other is the publicly offered one
using capital markets such as publicly registered
partnerships. Between 1970 and the end of 1983, the public
real estate syndication business raised $12 billion. Publicly
registered partnerships were responsible for $4.7 billion in
1983, while private partnerships accounted for $1.7 billion
[95].
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) are one type of
real estate syndication. In a REIT, the investor's funds are
trusted to the trustee, and the trustee invests funds in real
estate through equity or mortgage. In this case, the
management of the real estate is handled by professional third
parties, and the investor does not have to be concerned with
it.
An example of a REIT is shown in Exhibit 4. Rockefeller
Properties Inc. acted as the REIT in this case. Through
issuing common stock and convertible bonds, the REIT raised
funds from a wide range of investors in capital markets,
including Euro-markets, and provided the huge sum of $1.3
EXHIBIT 4
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REIT in Rockefeller Center Buildings
Industrial Bank of Japan
(Letter of Credit)
Assurance for
Interest Payments
<Borrower>
Partnership which
Owns Rockefeller
Center Buildings
Principal and Interests
Option for Acquiring
71.5% of Ownership
Loan ($1,300 million)
Current Coupon Zero Cou
Convertible Bond Converti
$335 million $215 mil
Euro-Market
(Source: Takita. [114])
RE IT
(Rockefeller
Properties
Inc.)
T T T
Common Stock
$750 million
pon
ble Bond
1 ion
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billion to the borrower. The other point to be noted is that
credit support for interest payments was added by the
Industrial Bank of Japan. It seems that the success of this
transaction was due to the facts that REITs avoid double
taxation for the investor and that the credit support adds
reliability to the REIT's securities, such as the common stock
and the convertible bonds. The capital for real estate
investment, thus, was raised, in the stock and bond markets.
REITs are examined more closely in Chapter III.
4. An Overview of Real Estate Capital Markets
The four submarkets of the real estate capital markets
developed along different paths. It can be said, however,
that they all started with the simple relationship between the
lender and the borrower and evolved to add the securities
markets as fund resources.
In the residential mortgage market, the yield curve
squeeze brought about the development of new loan structures
such as ARM, with its adjustable rate. This meant that the
interest risk, which had previously been borne by the
financial intermediaries, was transferred to the borrower.
The characteristics of the traditional mortgage and the new
mortgage are similar in that both are based on the one-on-one
relationship between the lender and the borrower. However,
because of disintermediation, securitization emerged and
changed this relationship. Securitization allows the
securities markets to be added as fund resources, and the
27
credit risk on the financial intermediaries can be transferred
to those markets.
In the commercial mortgage market, the traditional
mortgage was also based on the one-on-one relationship between
the lender and the borrower. However, the increase of the
sums required by financing as well as the increase in the cost
of that financing brought about a preference for cheaper and
stabler funds by certain borrowers. This caused
securitization to appear, and this connected the commercial
mortgage market with the securities markets.
In the commercial real estate equity market, new types of
ownership, such as real estate syndications, developed. The
difference between the traditional and the new types lies in
whether ownership is accompanied by direct concern with the
asset. Traditional ownership involves this concern; the new
type does not. Among the various kinds of new ownership
arrangements, devices such as public syndications add the
capital markets as fund resources. REITs are included in this
type of syndication.
Finally, there is the residential equity market, and this
is the only one of the four in which no development has been
seen.
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5. The Influence of Securitization on Real Estate Capital
Markets
Securitization in the real estate capital markets has had
a wide-ranging influence, as outlined below.
a. Specialization
Traditionally, the real estate capital markets were based
on a direct relationship between a lender and a borrower.
When mortgages are securitized, however, the roles played by
the participants in the markets become more complicated and
specialized. Such roles include origination/servicing,
packaging/issuing, investment, and guaranteeing (181 (701.
Based on the integration of these functions, securitization
provides alternatives both for investors in capital markets
and borrowers in real estate markets.
b. Integration
The integration of the real estate capital markets into
the more developed capital markets, which have closer
relationships with the stock and bond markets, has led to a
broader, more stable financial base for mortgages and lower
primary rates [181.
c. Volatility
At the same time, this integration brings volatility into
the real estate markets. The price of the real estate is
expressed by the security price in the capital markets, which
is different from that determined by traditional appraisal.
Regardless of the performance of the actual real estate, the
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security backed by it is affected by other securities
circulated in the capital markets [971.
d. Appropriate projects
The increased flow of capital into the real estate
capital markets creates a situation in which unsound real
estate projects may become the object of securitization.
Thus, unsound loans may be originated and sold off as
mortgage-backed securities. A possible result of this
situation would be the increased probability of defaults in
the underlying mortgages that serve as collateral for the
securities [181. As protection against this sort of
situation, however, the rating system would work to avoid
unsound mortgage-based securities.
D. Conclusion
The following conclusions can be reached from the above
discussion.
1. The participants in the U.S. financial markets are
specialized in their lines of business and separated by
region.
2. In the U.S., the Intermediation Financial Market and
the Private Financial Market are well balanced. This means
that borrowers and lenders participate in the two markets to
almost the same extent at present and it seems that the cost
or the effectiveness of the two is almost equal.
3. Real estate capital markets are important elements in
the U.S. capital markets. This means that developments in
30
these markets, developments such as securitization, affect the
capital markets as a whole.
4. The U.S. real estate capital markets developed from
the traditional mortgage and equity type to a new type. These
markets succeeded in diversifying their fund resources by
using capital markets. In short, securitization integrated
the traditional real estate capital markets and connected them
to the securities markets.
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CHAPTER II
JAPANESE REAL ESTATE CAPITAL MARKETS
A. Japanese Financial Markets Compared to the U.S.
The Japanese financial system, as shown in Exhibit 5, has
the following main features.
1. The business activities of the banking and securities
sectors are separated by the Securities and Exchange Law of
1948. This separation is quite similar to the separation
between investment and commercial banks in the U.S. This is
because the Securities and Exchange Law was originally
promulgated to effect the same ends as the Glass-Steagall Act.
It is to be noted, however, that the extent of the separation
is different in the two nations. Banks in Japan are allowed
to operate closely with securities companies in forming
syndicates to purchase government debt, banks can hold
corporate debt and banks can hold corporate equity. These
activities exceed those permitted to the U.S. commercial banks
(141.
2. Financial institutions are divided into short-term
(city banks, regional banks, etc.) and long-term (long-term
credit banks, trust banks, etc.) financial institutions. This
arrangement is unique to Japan. Basically, this situation
exists because the manufacturing industries, right after World
War II, needed a huge amount of capital for equipment
investment. The long-term financial institutions, in
particular, were expected to supply funds to these industries
Financial Institutions in JapanCN
EXHIBIT 5
- [Commercial
Banks]
[Spec i al i zed
- FinancialInst i tut ions]
[Central Bank]-
[Pr ivate
Financial
Institutions]
[Government
Financial
Institutions]
-K[Financial Institutionsfor Foreign Exchange]
- [Financial Institutions
for Long-term Credit]
- [Financial Institutions
for Small Business]
[Financial Institutions
- for Agriculture
Forestry and Fishery]
[Insurance Companies]
[Banks]
i [Public Corporations] -
[Others](Note: Figures denote the number in 1977.)(Source: Viner. [117])
- [Others]
The Bank of Japan
City banks (13)
Regional banks (63)
Foreign banks (54)
Speci ized foreign exchange bank (1)
Long-term credit banks (3)
Trust banks (7)
Mutual loan and savinas banks (71)
National Federation of Credit Assoc.
- Credit assoc. (470)
National Federation of Credit Coop.
- Credit coop. (489)
National Federation of Labor Credit Assoc.
- Labor credit assoc. (47)
Shoko Chukin Bank
Norin Chukin Bank
Credit federatiors of agricultural coop. (47)
- -Agr icultural coop. (4,738)
- Credit federations of fishery coop. (35)
-Fishery coop. (1,695)
- Federations of forestr coop. (46)
- Forestry coop, (2,139)
National Coop. Insurance Federation of Ag. Coop
- Coop. insurance federations of ag. coop. (47)
Life insurance companies (21)
Non-Iife insurance comanies (22)
Money market dealers ()
Securities finance corn (3)Securities companies (8)
Housing loan companies (7)
Export-import Bank of Jpan
Japan Development Bank
People's Finance Corp.
Small Bus iness F inance Corp.
Small Business Credit Insurance Corp.
Medical Care FaciIities Finance Corp.
Environmental Sanitaticn Business Finance corp.
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery Finance Corp.
Housing Loan Corp.
Hokkaido and Tohoku De~elopment Corp.
Local Public Enterprise Finance Corp.Okinawa Development Firance Corp.Overseas Economic Coop. Fund
Post offices (22,330)
Special accounts (4)
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with long-term fixed rates.
Recently, however, this separation has become unclear
because of deregulation, and both long-term and short-term
financial institutions deal with a broader range of borrowers
and have a broader maturity range in their overall loan
portfolios as well relying on a broader maturity range of
sources of funds than before.
3. The number of financial institutions in Japan is
rather small compared to the U.S. As of 1983, there were 86
banks, 996 institutions dealing in transactions with small
businesses, and agriculture, forestry and fishery concerns and
several hundred others [111]. In order to establish a
financial institution, it is essential to obtain the
permission of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and this is not
easy.
4. The regulation system for financial institutions is
quite different from that in the U.S. In Japan, since the
main power to regulate is vested in the national government,
rather than the dualistic system that obtains in the U.S., it
is more unified in structure. The MOF and the Bank of Japan
(BOJ) are the major regulators, followed by the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunication (MPT). Regulation by these
institutions is far more extensive than that in the U.S., and
it is not designed to encourage mortgages or any type of
consumer credit, but is more aimed at accommodating
industrialization, export-led economic growth and a high
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savings rate among individuals (141.
5. It is noteworthy that the Depression had a great
influence on regulation in the U.S. Regulation was designed
primarily to restrain competition to limit risk, especially
among banks; competitive restraints were closely monitored,
and a system of financial disclosure was enforced.
Compared to this, Japanese regulation is far more
extensive. It covers direct as well as indirect finance
because security markets are not well enough developed to have
monitoring or disclosure systems, i.e., there are no elements
to sustain the security markets other than regulation.
6. The security markets are not well developed in Japan
compared to those in the U.S., which cover the complete term
structure from very short to very long [14]. The Japanese
long-term securities markets have not developed until recently
for two reasons. One is that government budgets were balanced
and deficits were too small to necessitate developing the
securities markets as sources of funds. The other is that,
traditionally, most corporations have not used the securities
markets as a source of funds. This is because only the
largest corporations were allowed to issue securities under
strict limitations.
7. It is noted that the government plays a more
significant role in Japan's Intermediation Financial Market,
as compared to that in the U.S., via an extensive Postal
Savings System (PSS) and other public institutions. The PSS
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was established as a fund-raising institution for public
investment. The distributions of the total flow of funds to
final borrowers amounted to as much as 62.9% for deposit
banks.
The Japanese financial markets are, compared to these in
the U.S., based on more unified participants. Not only do the
long-term and short-term financial institutions play similar
roles, but the banks and securities companies are tied to one
another. Furthermore, extensive regulation is placed on both
direct and indirect finance by unified regulators, such as MOF
and BOJ.
B. Japanese Capital Markets Compared to the U.S.
In Japan, the term "capital markets" is not clearly
defined. For the purpose of this thesis, we will temporarily
ascribe this term to long-term financial markets that involve
the submarkets shown in Exhibit 6. There are several
differences between the Japanese and the U.S. capital markets
(see Exhibit 3 for reference).
1. Equity and Debt, or Direct and Indirect
In Exhibit 6, the real estate equity market does not
appear at all. In fact, it is very difficult to find data for
equity other than stock in Japan. The reason for this is as
follows.
In the Japanese capital markets as well as the real
estate capital markets, there is no concept of classifying
finance as equity and debt. Originally, this classification
EXHIBIT 6
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Japanese Capital Markets
(1988, Outstandings)
(100 Million Yen)
Amount
Loan
(Residential)
Corporate and Municipal Bonds)
(Local Government Bonds)
(Public Corporation Bonds)
(Bank Debentures)
(Industrial Bonds)
(Convertible Bonds)
(Yen-Denominated Foreign Bonds)
Government Bonds
Stock
Total
3,465,566
644,705
1,339,650
205,263
448,149
469,960
96,719
66,188
53,371
1,366,106
2,930,280
9,101,602
Share
38.1%
7.1%
14.7%
2.3%
4.9%
5.2%
1.1%
0.7%
0.6%
15.0%
32.2%
100.0%
(Note)
1. Stock is the total of market price of the listing
on the stock exchanges.
2. Data for government bonds is 1985.
(Source: Bank of Japan, Ministry of Finance)
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arose from the essential needs of the borrower and the lender
as to whether the principal should be returned or not after a
certain period. Finance in which funds should be returned
after a certain period is called debt, while that not returned
is called equity. In the U.S., this classification seems to
be approved by the writers of almost all literature concerning
finance.
On the contrary, almost all Japanese literature is based
on a classification of finance as indirect or direct.
Originally, this classification was made on the basis of
whether the funds were raised through financial intermediaries
or not. Finance with intermediaries is called indirect, while
that without is called direct.
It would appear that this difference in the way of
thinking comes from the fact that the Japanese markets are
less developed than those in the U.S. What this means is that
the main issue in Japan is still "how" to raise the funds,
rather than "what" the raised funds mean for the borrower and
"what" the invested funds mean for the investor. Thus, it is
very difficult to make a direct comparison between the U.S.
and Japanese capital markets.
2. Direct and Indirect Finance
a. Japanese capital markets compared to the U.S. capital
markets
As already mentioned, the difference between indirect and
direct finance is whether the funds are raised through banks
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or raised directly from the capital markets. The ratio of
indirect to direct finance is defined as the ratio of bank
loans or mortgages to the total of stocks and bonds. In
Japan, this ratio was 4:6 in 1986, while in the U.S., it was
3:7 in 1988. These figures mean that indirect finance is used
more in Japan than in the U.S. The main reason for this is
outlined below.
The influence of banks on the Japanese economy is still
significant. First of all, the close relationship between
Japanese banks and companies has considerable importance. A
significant example of this relationship can be seen in the
business groups led by several large banks; these are called
ZAIBATSU in Japanese. As of 1985, the six largest of these
groups, led by Mitsui Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, Sumitomo Bank,
Fuji Bank, Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank and Sanwa Bank, respectively,
controlled more than 60% of the companies listed in the first
section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). (The TSE is
composed of two sections. The first section is for the larger
and superior companies; the second section is for the others.)
In addition to this, the total assets of these six business
groups amounted to around 15% of the Japanese economy as a
whole in 1986. Because the banks that head up these groups
have significant sway over their members' fund-raising, the
influence of these banks can hardly be neglected. The close
relation between banks and securities companies makes this
influence possible.
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b. Indirect and Direct Finance in Japan
As was mentioned above, the ratio of indirect to direct
finance in Japan was 4:6 in 1986. This figure, however, needs
to be examined more closely.
i. Data issue
Exhibit 6 shows the stock price as the current market
price in order to compare the capital market sizes of Japan
and the U.S. This is misleading in terms of the fund-raising
activities of the companies because current market price does
not mean the amount of capital raised by the companies, i.e.,
the issuing price, because the market price is usually higher
than the issuing price as long as the company's operations are
going well.
Actually, most of the literature written in Japan uses
the issuing price to express the fund-raising activity of a
company [14] [111] [112]. Based on this, stock amounted to
only 1.6% of total asset outstandings in Japan in 1984, while
bank loans made up 30.1% [112]. From these figures, then, we
can conclude that bank loans are still a significant fund-
raising alternative in present-day Japan. The figures also
back up the above assertions about the strong influence of
Japanese banks on the Japanese economy.
ii. Accessibility of the stock and bond markets
The fact that only the large companies can afford to tap
the stock and bond markets in Japan is of considerable
significance. One reason for this is that there are a number
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of strict limitations on the issuance of stocks and bonds in
Japanese capital markets [83]. For example, in issuing
straight bonds, the company must use full collateral and meet
strict and detailed criteria. Furthermore, the coupon rate of
the bond is determined by a rigid interest-rate system based
on long-term government bonds, and it does not reflect the
financial condition of the company at all.
With stocks, there are also strict regulations, such as
the financial condition of the company, limitation of the
issuance volume, and the minimum profit distribution. These
restrictions, although their original purpose was to ensure
the healthy development of the market, have discouraged all
but the largest and most influential of Japanese firms from
issuing stocks and bonds. Consequently, for smaller
companies, indirect finance is not a marginal source of fund-
raising.
Thus, it can be said that the influence of the bank
intermediary in Japan is still quite significant as compared
to that in the U.S. and that the stock and bond markets are
still not accessible to Japanese companies, unless they are
very large firms.
3. Bank Debentures (Long-term Financial Institutions)
Bank debentures in Japan should be noted. Long-term
financial institutions include long-term credit banks and
trust banks. The former issue one-year discount debentures
and five-year debentures, the outstandings of which amounted
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to 46,969 billion yen at the end of 1986. The trust banks
also fund with one-year and five-year negotiable loan trust
certificates. The funds raised by these debentures and
certificates are provided to industry in the form of long-term
corporate business loans. In this way, the long-term
financial institutions in Japan have, in part, mitigated the
necessity for direct corporate funding from the capital
markets.
C. Japanese Real Estate Capital Markets
Japanese real estate capital markets appear to be based
only on corporate business loans in the capital markets. It
is noteworthy that the relationship between the real estate
capital markets and other capital markets is not necessarily
and explicitly recognized in present-day Japan. Only the
large companies raise funds in the capital markets for real
estate transactions. This is because Japanese real estate
capital markets are not so well developed as those in the
U.S., where securitization makes it possible for the real
estate business to raise funds in the stock and bond markets
through MBS.
There are three ways to picture the size and
characteristics of the Japanese real estate capital markets.
The first is through real estate business loans, the second is
through real estate secured loans, and the third is through
housing loans.
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1. Real Estate Business Loans (Corporate Loans to the Real
Estate Industry)
In order to picture the Japanese real estate capital
markets, it will be useful to examine the real estate business
loan, i.e., a corporate loan to the real estate industry. In
this view of the markets, it is to be noted that real estate
business undertaken by segments of industry other than the
real estate industry is excluded. In short, real estate
business loans do not entirely explain the Japanese real
estate capital markets.
At the end of 1986, loans to the real estate industry in
Japan amounted to 27,845.2 billion yen, and this represented
10.4% of the total outstanding loan balance to all industries
(Exhibit 7). The growth rate of loan outstandings of the real
estate industry between 1985 to 1986 was 135.1%, second only
to the service sector. From the figures shown in Exhibit 7,
steady growth is evident.
The balance sheet shown in Exhibit 8 illustrates the
dependency on debt and equity of all classes of Japanese real
estate companies. In this connection, the following two
points are worthy of note.
The first is that the amount of outstanding loans is
significant in most of the companies. In the majority of
cases, the long-term loan payable amounts to around 30% of
total liabilities and net worth. On the contrary, stocks
account for only around 3% and bonds less than 1%. This shows
EXHIBIT 7
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Share of Real Estate Industry
in Loans and discounts
(Outstandings)
(100 Million Yen)
1984
Real Estate
(Share)
Individuals
(Share)
Services
(Share)
Manufacturers
(Share)
Wholesale, Retail
(Share)
Total *
167,647
7.5%
218,372
9.8%
213,825
9.6%
594,090
26.6%
483,680
21.7%
2,230,435
100.0%
1985
206,049
8.4%
234,684
9.6%
259,239
10.6%
619,086
25.2%
509,056
20.7%
2,455,046
100.0%
1986
278,452
10.4%
268,917
10.0%
610,489
22.8%
609,317
22,7%
520,637
19.4%
2,680,207
100.0%
'86/'85
135.1%
114.6%
235.5%
98.4%
102.3%
109.2%
(Note) * Includes other industries
(Source: Bank of Japan)
EXHIBIT 8
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(Real Estate Industry)
Average Balance Sheet by Size of Companies
(1986)
(100 Million Yen)
Capital Size Iota I
Number of Companies
Accumulated Share
# of Companies
Asset Total
Current Asset
Fixed Asset
Deferred Charges
Less Than 50 100 More Than
2 2-5 5-10 10-50 -100 -1000 1000
167,916 54,835 48,587 29,690 30,109 2,894 1,637 164
100.0% 32.7% 61.6% 79.3% 97.2% 98.9% 99.9% 100.0%
100.0% 4.6% 11.7% 19.6% 44.0% 56.6% 81.3% 100.0%
341,990 14,434 26,136 22,814 85,832 40,181 89,367 63,227
54.3% 49.8% 58.5% 46.0% 55.8% 50.8% 57.3% 53.8%
286,964 14,495 18,565 26,716 67,771 38,726 66,489 54,202
45.6% 50.0% 41.5% 53.9% 44.0% 49.0% 42.6% 46.1%
766 51 14 20 279 136 179
o.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1%
87
0.1%
Asset Total 629, 720 28, 980 44, 715 49, 550 153, 882
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
79,043 156,035 117,516
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Current Liabilities
Long- Term
Liabilities
(Bonds Payable)
(Loan Payable)
Net Worth
(Capital)
Liabilities &
Net Worth Total
310,838 15,161 22,701 23,148 83,341 35,999 78,033 52,454
49.4% 52.3% 50.8% 23.6% 54.2% 45.5% 50.0% 44.6%
265,204 13,149 19,270 21,012 54,437 40,921 67,225 49,190
42.1% 45.4% 43.1% 21.4% 35.4% 51.8% 43.1% 41.9%
4, 383
0.7%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0 93 4,290
0.0% 0.1% 3.7%
202,511 10,707 16,001 14,548 44,191 35,736 51,060 30,268
32.2% 36.9% 35.8% 14.8% 28.7% 45.2% 32.7% 25.8%
53,678 670 2,744 53,890 16,103 2,122 10,777 15,871
8.5% 2.3% 6.1% 55.0% 10.5% 2.7% 6.9% 13.5%
22,221 518 1,311 1,749 6,682 1,917 3,710 6,333
3.5% 1.8% 2.9% 1.8% 4.3% 2.4% 2.4% 5.4%
629,720 28,980 44,715 98,050 153,881
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
79,042 156,035 117,515
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
(Source: Ministry of Finance)
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the heavy dependence on bank loans for capital resources.
The second is the difference in the balance sheets
depending on the size of the companies. There is a great
variation in the composition of long-term liabilities. In the
real estate industry, the benefits of issuing stocks and bonds
to raise capital are restricted to large companies. The share
of bonds payable is almost nil for most of the industry except
for the large companies, while the share of capital, i.e.,
stock, is around 3%, also except for large companies. This
situation can be explained by the high standards for issuing
stocks and bonds. In Japan, in order to issue a corporate
stock or bond, a company must meet certain standards, such as
required collateral, asset size or dividends.
Consequently, balance sheets show that only large
companies can meet the criteria for using the stock or bond
market for fund-raising, and that for most of the real estate
companies, fund-raising through these markets is marginal.
This is quite different from the U.S., where, as we have
seen in Chapter I, the real estate capital markets have
established a wide pipeline to other capital markets through
securitization. In the U.S., the fundamental market freedom
makes it possible to draw capital from the stock and bond
markets into the real estate market.
2. Real Estate Secured Loans
Another way to understand Japanese real estate capital
markets is through the real estate secured loan, which
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includes housing loans and some corporate business loans. It
is to be noted that the funds raised through real estate
secured loans are not always used to invest in real estate.
They are often used instead for regular business operations.
The characteristics of the real estate secured loan are
similar to those of the U.S. commercial and residential
mortgages. These loans, however, do not have any secondary
market as the U.S. mortgage markets do.
Exhibit 9 shows three striking trends in the area of
secured loans: a) the share of real estate secured loans
decreased from 31% of outstanding in 1976 to 22% in 1986; b)
during the same period, the share of unsecured loans increased
from 32% to 40%; c) the shares of other types of loans
remained the same. The main reason for these changes seems to
be that the bargaining power of the borrower became stronger
as the loan market softened and borrowers became less inclined
to pay large fees (usually 0.3% of the amount borrowed) just
to register the collateral.
3. Housing Loans
The characteristics of housing loans in Japan are quite
similar to those of the U.S. residential mortgage. Taking the
house or land as collateral, the financial institutions
provide capital. However, there is a great difference as
well, and that is the fact that the U.S. residential mortgage
market has a well-developed secondary market, while that in
Japan is still in its infancy. Basically in Japan, there is
EXHIBIT 9
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Outstanding Loans
of All Banks
by Kind of Collateral
(100 Million Yen)
Loans With
Third
Party's
Guarantee
190,899
213,323
237, 510
278,628
309, 301
334, 529
384,122
435,388
502, 146
574,211
631, 746
25%
26%
26%
27%
27%
27%
26%
27%
27%
27%
26%
Unsecured
Loans
244, 206
262,056
290,577
332,554
384, 497
423, 938
541,830
636,945
736,313
894,088
970,846
Total
32% 757,807 100%
32% 831,305 100%
32% 919,364 100%
32% 1,037,536 100%
34% 1,144,693 100%
34% 1,237,596 100%
37% 1,455,404 100%
39% 1,640,098 100%
40% 1,855,189 100%
41% 2,157,714 100%
40% 2,400,930 100%
(Note) 1.
2.
(Source: Bank of Japan)
Loans
Secured by
Real Estate
& Floating
Mortgages
Loans
Secured by
Stocks &
Bonds
Other
Secured
Loans
67,744
78,599
86,731
95,538
103,806
115,879
131,442
145,248
163,090
179,928
229, 765
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
238,279
260,802
285, 572
311,319
326, 784
341,864
374,654
397,437
422, 075
470,190
521,404
31%
31%
31%
30%
29%
28%
26%
24%
23%
22%
22%
16,677
16,522
18, 972
19,495
20,303
21,384
23,354
25,075
31,558
39,292
47,163
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
8%
10%
Including loans of overseas branches.
Other secured loans are loans secured by deposits, etc.
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no thought of passing the original loan on to third parties
who do not know the loan's characteristics at all. Without
any credit support system, such as rating or credit support,
it is very difficult to pass the credit risk to third parties,
i.e., investors in the capital markets.
a. Primary market
The most important characteristic of housing loans in
Japan is the dominant role played by the public sector--the
Housing Loan Corporation (HLC)--in the market (Exhibit 10).
The outstandings of housing loans by the HLC in 1986 were
23,034.5 billion yen, or 35.7% of all housing loan
outstandings in that year. Established in 1950, the HLC
supplies long-term, low cost funds for housing. It should be
noted that, because the HLC is a public corporation funded
totally by the government, rather than a private financial
institution that raises funds through interest-sensitive
deposits, it does not need to worry about selling the existing
loans. This seems to be the reason that an efficient
secondary market has not yet been developed in Japan. At the
same time, the rapid increase of loans by private financial
institutions, particularly city banks, has been noteworthy of
late. In 1986, 26.3% of all new housing loans were originated
by the city banks and the amount of these loans was triple the
level in 1981. This increase can be partly explained by the
tendency of city banks to engage in more retail banking. It
is also believed (Asahi Shimbun, May 25, 1988) that city banks
EXHIBIT 10
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Housing Loans (New Loans)
(100 Million Yen) 1981
Amount Share
Banking Accounts OF All Banks
City Banks
Regional Banks
Trust Banks
Long-Term Credit Banks
Trust Accounts of All Banks
Sogo Banks
Shinkin Banks
The Zenshinren Bank
Credit Cooperatives
The National Federation of Credit Cooperatives
Labor Credit Associates
Agricultural Cooperatives
Mutual Insurance Federations of Agricultural Coop
Life Insurance Companies
Non-Life Insurance Companies
Housing Loan Companies
The Housing Loan Corporation
Total
23,07
12,29
9,52
91
3,57
5,60
8, 23
42
1,50
29
2,22
2
5,81
22
11, 1(
26, 17
4 26.1%
1 13.9%
9 10.8%
4 0.4%
9 1.0%
1 4.0%
3 6.3%
1 9.3%
9 0.5%
3 1.7%
7 0.3%
4 2.5%
0 0.0%
6 0.0%
5 6.6%
0 0.2%
8 12.6%
0 29.6%
88,271 100.0%
1986
Amount Share
53,654
37,561
14,418
174
1,500
3,745
8,999
10,671
108
1,367
595
3,321
0
2
6,098
638
22,108
31, 546
37.6%
26.3%
10.1%
0.1%
1.1%
2.6%
6.3%
7.5%
0.1%
1.0%
0.4%
2.3%
0.0%
0.0%
4.3%
0.4%
15.5%
22.1%
142,852 100.0% 161.8%
Housing Loans (Outstandings)
(100 Million Yen)
Banking Accounts OF All Banks
City Banks
Regional Banks
Trust Banks
Long-Term Credit Banks
Trust Accounts of Al I Banks
Sogo Banks
Shinkin Banks
The Zenshinren Bank
Credit Cooperatives
The National Federation of Cr
Labor Credit Associates
Agricultural Cooperatives
Mutual Insurance Federations
Life Insurance Companies
Non-Life Insurance Companies
Housing Loan Companies
The Housing Loan Corporation
Total
1981
Amount Share
edit Cooperatives
)f Agricultural Coop
130,834
65,977
56,854
2,511
5,490
24,878
29,036
41,925
3,372
5,990
1,409
11, 833
18,853
696
24,270
1,532
37,813
127, 790
28.4%
14.3%
12.4%
0.5%
1.2%
5.4%
6.3%
9.1%
0.7%
1.3%
0.3%
2.6%
4.1%
0.2%
5.3%
0.3%
8.2%
27.8%
1986
Amount Share
172,566
100,505
64,228
2,149
5,683
23,827
34,761
47,309
1, 372
6,220
1,413
14,216
18,835
567
35, 608
2,386
55,280
230,345
460,231 100.0% 644,705 100.0%
(Source: Bank of Japan)
Growth
'86/'81
232.5%
305.6%
151.3%
52.1%
163.2%
104.9%
160.6%
129. 6%
25.2%
91.0%
200. 3%
149.3%
0.0%
7.7%
104.9%
290. 0%
199. 0%
120. 5%
26.8%
15.6%
10.0%
0.3%
0.9%
3.7%
5.4%
7.3%
0.2%
1.0%
0.2%
2.2%
2.9%
0.1%
5.5%
0.4%
8.6%
35. 7%
Growth
'86/'81
131. 9%
152.3%
113. 0%
85.6%
103.5%
95.8%
119. 7%
112.8%
40.7%
103. 8%
100. 3%
120.1%
99.9%
81.5%
146. 7%
155. 7%
146. 2%
180. 3%
140. 1%
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intend to establish a foothold in the coming securitization
of real estate, particularly that of housing loans. As
already mentioned, housing loans are homogeneous in their loan
characteristics, so this area seems to be the place to start
with securitization.
b. Emergence of the secondary market
At present, it is a fact that there is not yet an
efficient secondary market in the Japanese housing loan
market. The examples given below, however, surely represent
efforts in that direction.
i. Mortgage security
The basic framework of this system is that the original
lender asks the government registry office to issue mortgage
security to prove the real estate secured loan. The original
lender receives the mortgage security from the registry office
and sells smaller units of the secondary securities, backed by
the mortgage security, to the final investors (Exhibit 11).
The issuance of a mortgage security changes the characteristic
of the loan credit from a personal debtor-creditor
relationship to impersonal obligation of the debtor.
Consequently, liquidity is added to the real estate secured
loan.
Although liquidity is high, the issuance is an intricate
and costly task. The system for this kind of transaction was
established in 1931 and has not changed since. Originally,
the system was set up to replace real estate secured loans
EXHIBIT 11
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Structure of Mortgage Security
Borrower
4.Paper Examination
Registry Office
T
3.Offer of Issuing 5.Issue and Delivery of
Mortgage Security Mortgage Security
1 Lon" Off- 8 Cash Pa ment
(Mortgage)
2.Loan
10. Payment of
Interest
12.Payment of
Principal
Lender
Mortgage
Security
Dealing
Company)
9.Sales of
Mortgage
Security
11.Payment of
Interest
13.Payment of
Principal
Investor
T
6.Offer of Safe Deposit 7.Delivery of Safe
for Mortgage Security Deposit Certificate
Bank
(Source: Nippon Credit Bank)
Issuance of Mortgage Security
(Billion Yen)
(Source: Ministry of Law)
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held by short-term banks with loans by long-term banks, not
to make fund-raising easier for the real estate owner or to
circulate the mortgage security in the market [1151.
Recently, such issuances have increased, but have not yet
reached a level that could be called a secondary market.
ii. Housing mortgage certificates
This is a system for financing housing loan companies by
other financial institutions (Exhibit 12). The housing loan
company, as the original lender, bundles its housing loans
with similar conditions with the permission of the debtor.
Backed by the bundle of loans, the housing loan company issues
a housing mortgage certificate to other financial institutions
with a payment guarantee. The retransfer of this certificate,
however, is prohibited for the following reasons. The first
is that, if a retransfer were allowed, the certificate would
become fairly competitive with bank debentures issued by long-
term banks. The second reason is that these certificates are
not equipped with third-party guarantees, which would make it
possible for them to circulate in the capital markets. This
lack of liquidity prevents a secondary market from developing.
iii. Housing loan trusts
Under this arrangement, a housing loan company trusts its
own credit to a trust bank and receives a benefit certificate
issued by that bank. The housing loan company then, in turn,
transfers this certificate to a pension fund, which acts as an
investor to refinance the loan. Again, retransfer is
EXHIBIT 12
Housing Mortgage Certificate
Loan Debtor
Loan Debtor
Loan Debtor
Government
T
2.Issuance Report
1.Credit &
Mortgage
> Housing Loan
Company
4 Repayment
I T
4.Repayment
I
Mortgage
Certificate
Refinance I~ Guarantee
Investor
(Transferee)
(Financial Institution)
X Retransfer Prohibited
Other Investors
(Source: Japan Mortgage Security Association)
Outstandings of Housing Mortgage Certificate
(Billion Yen)
(Source: Ministry of Finance)
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restricted for the same reasons as outlined above. The low
liquidity, the high issuance cost and the restrictions on the
trust terms make the secondary market very small (Exhibit
13).
4. An Overview of the Real Estate Capital Markets and
Comparison to the U.S.
There is no established concept of real estate capital
markets in Japan; they are controlled by bank loans. In this
connection, it should be noted that the three types of
transactions outlined above are all bank loans. Consequently,
the Japanese real estate capital markets are distinct from
both the stock and bond markets. There is not even a
significant secondary market for any real estate capital
markets. This is clearly different from the situation in the
U.S., where financial transactions are structured to allow the
real estate business to choose from many capital resources,
including mortgages, bonds and stocks. In short, the Japanese
real estate capital markets are still centered around the
traditional type of equity and debt financing and have not
developed to utilize the securities markets as capital
resources. The reasons for this delay can be outlined as
follows.
The first is that Japanese securities markets are not
developed yet. Even though there are the real-estate-related
securities such as mortgage securities, they can not be used
if there are no markets in which to circulate them.
EXHIBIT 13
Housing Loan Trust
4.Repayment
2. Trust Contract -+
(7 Years)
2.Benefit -
Certificate
3.
<-5.Dividend
Regulation on Retransfer
Investor
(Source: Japan Mortgage Security Association)
Outstandings of Housing Loan Trust
(Billion Yen)
(Source: Ministry of Finance)
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Secondly, the dependency of Japanese real estate
companies on bank loans for fund-raising is still high. In
the Japanese real estate capital markets as well as in the
capital markets in general, the concept of the essential needs
of the borrower and the lender, i.e., equity and debt, has not
yet appeared. In the U.S., on the other hand, this is the
basis of fund-raising. This situation itself explains the
lack of development of real estate financing in Japan compared
to that in the U.S. Large projects, however, such as the
redevelopment of Tokyo or the development of Tokyo Bay, have
been provoking serious discussions on how stable and cheap
capital can be raised. This is because, at present, only
those companies that have established a name or reputation in
the bank loan market can borrow capital at close to the prime
rate, while others have to borrow at several hundred basis
points above the prime rate, no matter how promising the
project.
D. Conclusion
From the discussion in this chapter, the following
conclusions can be drawn.
1. The Japanese financial markets are based on quite
unified participants and regulators. This is different from
the situation in the U.S., which is full of diversity.
2. In the Japanese capital markets, the influence of the
banks is still strong in terms of bank loans as well as in
their importance in the economy as a whole as compared to the
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U.S.
3. The long-term financial institutions in Japan are
unique. They play the role of the Private Financial Market in
part by debenture issuance. This helps explain the lower
dependency on bonds for fund-raising.
4. Bank loans have traditionally been dominant in the
real estate capital markets, and there is no efficient
connection between these markets and those for stocks and
bonds. In other words, Japanese real estate capital markets
have yet to enter a new stage in their development.
5. Consequently, there have been no successful efforts to
date in Japan to structure the real estate financing
transactions to create a bridge between real estate and other
capital markets.
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CHAPTER III
THE U.S. EXPERIENCE WITH REITs
A. What Are REITs?
1. The Main Characteristics of REITs
REITs are a specialized form of trust ownership created
by Congressional action; their basic structure is defined by
the Internal Revenue Code (871. With REITs, there is no
federal income or capital gains tax for the shareholders;
thus, double taxation is avoided. This system was designed
mainly to give small investors the chance to participate in
large-scale real estate investments with professional
management and limited liability.
The liquidity of REITs is to be noted. Usually, REIT
shares are priced from $10 to $30 and are traded on the stock
market. Additionally, REITs spread the development risk of a
project to investors in the capital markets.
Based on the asset allocation, there are three types of
REITs: equity, mortgage and hybrid [90]. Equity REITs
involve the purchase of properties on either a leveraged or an
unleveraged basis. Mortgage REITs provide intermediate and
long-term financing for development projects and existing
income-producing properties. Hybrid REITs are a combination
of equity and mortgage REITs.
2. Eligibility Requirements for Conduit Tax Treatment
In order for REITs to obtain preferable conduit tax
treatment, i.e., the avoidance of double taxation, they must
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meet the following requirements of the Internal Revenue Code
[87].
a. The REIT must be a corporation or a common law trust.
b. The REIT must have at least 100 beneficial owners.
c. The REIT may not hold property primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business.
d. The REIT must derive at least 90% of its gross income
from specified real estate sources.
e. The REIT should distribute more than 95% of its income
in the year the income is earned or in the following year.
f. The REIT should meet a series of asset tests other
than the above.
As can be seen here, it is not a simple matter to meet
these requirements, and failure to do so causes the REIT to
lose its preferential tax status.
B. U.S. Experience to Date
A close examination of the features of REITs can be made
by looking at past U.S. experience with this sort of
investment.
REITs were developed to allow tax-exempt ownership of
real estate. Assets in this form of investment increased
rapidly, from $1 billion in 1968 to a peak of $20 billion in
1974. Beginning in 1972, however, mortgage REITs were
profoundly affected by the increase of interest rates, and
many of them collapsed, while a number of equity REITs
continued their path of slow and steady growth. Motivated by
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this collapse and in an effort to survive the recession of
1974 and 1975, many mortgage REITs changed their management
policies. As a result, a resurgence of the REIT industry has
been seen recently. The total assets of this sector amounted
to $18,651 million in 1986.
The reasons for the collapse of mortgage REITs, the
changes of management policies and recent issues will now be
examined.
1. Capital Structure
When interest rates increased in the early 1970's, the
REIT industry was heavily leveraged. Consequently, the debt-
to-equity ratio of the industry in 1973 was 4:1. Furthermore,
short-term debt was the main source of REITs' capital,
amounting to more than 50% of the total in 1975 [82]. Thus,
the increase of interest rates had a profound effect on REITs
and caused many of them to collapse.
Starting in 1976, shareholder equity increased gradually
to a much healthier debt-to-equity ratio, and by 1983, it had
dropped to 1:1. The short-term debt also declined to less
than 10% of total capital in 1986. Instead, REITs supplied
funds through mortgages or MBSs, with 14.58% and 18.07%,
respectively, of total capital in 1986.
Recently, the REIT industry has been utilizing more
innovative ways to raise capital. Current REITs offerings
include not only typical issues such as common stock and
shares of beneficial interest, but more sophisticated
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instruments, such as warrants, preferred stock, and debentures
with conversion figures [7] [91]. The purpose of these new
instruments is to tailor offerings to the requirements of
different types of investors. For example, in 1985, the
Prudential Realty Trust, a REIT sponsored and advised by a
subsidiary of the Prudential Insurance Company of America,
registered an offering of 11 million income shares and an
equal number of capital shares of beneficial interest of the
trust. Dividends paid to the income shareholders were to be
based on the trust's capital flow, while those paid on the
capital shares were to be based on the REIT's capital gains.
The newest REITs also utilize debt instruments to shelter part
of the cash distribution. The REIT registered by Trammel Crow
forecasts that 69% of its distributable cash would represent
tax-free return of capital. The shelter is achieved through
the use of zero coupon bond interest deductions [91].
2. Asset Allocation
Many of the mortgage REITs that collapsed were those
concentrated on construction and development loans. In 1970,
such loans amounted to 55% of the total assets of the REIT
industry. This ratio decreased to as little as 8% in 1984;
instead, equity investment and mortgage investment increased,
with 44% and 38% of the total assets in that same year. It
should be noted in particular that most of the REITs that
collapsed were short-term mortgage REITs, which lacked the
necessary diversification of assets and were seriously hurt
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when developers were forced to terminate projects prior to
completion and defaulted on their construction loans.
3. Advisor Function
The advisor institution seeks to obtain fees from REITs
or to use REITs to generate business for its allied activities
or to finance some of its real estate ventures. In order to
comply with the Internal Revenue Code, the advisor should be
separated from the REITs. In general, advisors to date have
been commercial banks, financial conglomerates, mortgage
bankers or life insurance companies.
During the most recent recession, many of the troubled
REITs were sponsored by the banks or by their mortgage banking
affiliates. Their problems arose from the fact that they were
allowed to use heavier debts than other types of REITs. In
1974, 70% of the bank-affiliated REITs depended on bank
capital, which accounted for more than 60% of total capital.
By comparison, the figure for non-bank-affiliated REITs was
only 39% [101].
Recently, REITs sponsored by developers or cosponsored by
developers and major financial institutions, such as MSA
Corporation (founded by Melvin Simon & Associates), EQK
Investors (founded by a partnership between the Equitable Life
Insurance Company and Kravco Inc.), Turner Equity Investors
Inc. (founded by a subsidiary of the Turner Corporation), have
emerged. These developers can offer the REITs their
management skills and experience. Additionally, they may own
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investment-grade properties that the REITs can acquire. For
the developers, the REITs can be utilized to raise capital
less expensively than might be possible by obtaining financing
from banks or insurance companies; they can also obtain fee
income as REITs advisors [911.
It is noteworthy that there is a conflict of interest
between the REITs and the developer. For example, the price
of the property of the advisor developer might be higher than
that offered by another third party. Although there are
several safeguards against this type of situation, such as the
independent policy statement of the REITs or the subordination
of the fees paid to a REIT advisor to the distributions paid
to the shareholders, it must be noted that these safeguards
are entirely voluntary.
4. Risk Related to REITs
It should be pointed out that REITs have to depend on
capital assets and debts for sources of reinvestment because
they are required to distribute 95% of their income. This is
a disadvantage in times of a depressed stock market because
REITs are dependent on debt and this situation tends to
increase the unsystematic risk.
5. Tax Reform Act of 1986
Real estate investment was adversely affected by this
act. REITs, on the other hand, gained relative advantages as
outlined below (35]:
a. The marginal tax rate decreased, while the capital
64
gains tax increased. As a result, investments such as REITs,
which return most of their investment profit to the investors,
became more attractive than ever before.
b. The disappearance of accelerated depreciation did not
affect REITs because they used straight-line deprecation.
6. Performance of REITs
Several recent studies on the performance of REITs have
noted the following points:
a. REITs have performed no better or worse than common
stock, nor have they been more or less risky [56).
b. Equity REITs are higher in return and lower in
volatility than mortgage REITs (Exhibit 14) (12] (561. As
Burns says, "the investor should distinguish between equity
and non-equity REITs" in creating a portfolio (12].
c. REITs' return performance tracks the S&P 500 index
closely. This is because most REITs' shares are traded in the
capital markets. Equity REITs, in particular, behaves more
like a small stock series than does the S&P 500 (261. Equity
REITs also exhibit essentially the same volatility as common
stocks.
d. The REIT industry is experiencing more stable rates of
return now than it did in the past (Exhibit 14) [561. One
reason for this development is that REITs are relying on more
conservative management than before, being involved more in
longer-term equity and mortgage assets than in short-term
construction and development loans [381 [561. Thus, it can be
EXHIBIT 14
Annual Average Net Return
and Variance Values
1980 - 1984
Equity REITs
Average Net Return
0.208
0.157
0.107
0.082
0.090
Variance
0.030
0.016
0.011
0.003
0.001
Mortgage REITs
Average Net Return
0.072
0.021
0.042
0.051
0.015
(Source: Kuhle. [55])
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Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
Variance
0.031
0.030
0.018
0.019
0.023
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observed that the REIT industry has learned from its past
mistakes.
7. REITs Investors
NAREIT reports that, during the first nine months of
1985, 21 REITs completed initial public offerings, raising
$2.3 billion, as compared with $711 million in 1984.
Substantial new investment capital, particularly from tax-
exempt employee pension plans and IRA and Keogh accounts, is
going into REITs. This is because, besides the fact that
REITs' earnings are not subject to federal income tax, for
tax-exempt investors under an IRS ruling, REITs dividends
distributed to tax-exempted pension plans and IRA and Keogh
accounts are not subject to taxation as unrelated business
taxable income.
C. Issues at Present
1. Issues Peculiar to Equity-oriented REITs
a. Measurement of value
The basic function of equity REITs is to own and hold
real property for long periods of time. These properties may
appreciate in value over the holding period. However,
measuring that appreciation rate is tricky, because the value
of real property is estimated by appraisers [35]. Thus, an
appraisal involves an unavoidable aspect of subjective
judgement.
b. Equity investment risk
Because equity REITs invest directly in the property,
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investment risk related to geographic factors and vacancy
rates of the property itself must be considered.
2. Issues Peculiar to Mortgage-oriented REITs
a. Capital Structure
Early mortgage REITs borrowed heavily on a short-term
basis and made short-term loans. These funds suffered in an
era of rising and volatile interest rates. REITs that borrow
heavily in the long-term market and lend on long-term
mortgages must make their profit on the spread. Their lending
rates must be substantially higher than their borrowing rates.
The difference goes to the shareholders' profits [35].
b. Lending risks
Mortgage REITs are exposed to such lending risks as
credit risk, interest rate risk, prepayment risk and
reinvestment risk.
3. Appropriate Flow of Capital Through REITs
One of the reasons why the REIT industry collapsed in the
past recession is that an excessive amount of capital flowed
into the real estate markets through REITs [90]. Many REITs
could not find appropriate investment properties, and they had
to seek much riskier investment properties, such as
construction and development loans, than might be considered
desirable [901 [101]. Although the investment policies of
REITs changed after the recession, the issue of the
appropriate amount of capital flow through REITs still
remains.
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4. Loan Orientation of REITs
By nature, players in the capital markets, i.e., Wall
Street, will pay for earnings, not cash flow. It is better
for REITs to lend money in situations in which 100% of the
earnings are reportable and taxable than to own real estate
with depreciation shelter reducing taxable income, but not
cash flow. For this reason, the bulk of REITs' money
initially went into loans rather than equity investment [1071,
and this loan orientation caused many REITs to collapse. In
short, an understanding of REITs in terms of the
characteristics of real estate investment is important.
Although this understanding seems to have improved in the
U.S. because of the recession experience, it still must be
considered when weighing the applicability of REITs to Japan.
D. Conclusion--REITs in the U.S. Real Estate Capital Markets
REITs, which were designed by Congress to sidestep double
taxation, play the role of conduit in the U.S. real estate
capital markets. The fundamental management policy of the
industry was learned from its recession experience. Based on
this, REITs changed their asset composition from short-term to
long-term and from debt to equity. Thus, as mentioned above,
the investment risk in REITs was certainly cut.
A total evaluation of REITs' performance, however, has
not yet been made. In part, it can be said that REITs should
be treated as an investment instrument quite different from
direct real estate investment. The correlation between REITs
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and stocks is strong, and REITs can surely be considered a
hybrid security.
It is apparent that REITs enable the small investor to
participate in the real estate capital markets through small
units of shares. Additionally, they allow the real estate
industry to diversify its capital resources by connecting its
capital markets with other capital markets.
Finally, the following two points are to be noted.
1. REITs transfer the capital in the stock and bond
markets as well as the price volatility in these markets to
the real estate capital markets.
2. REITs were essentially created by Congress for the
small investor's tax benefit, not necessarily because of
requirements by the industry. This situation is likely to
cause a flood of capital in the real estate capital markets
and make unsound investment likely.
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Chapter IV
THE APPLICABILITY OF REITs
TO JAPANESE REAL ESTATE CAPITAL MARKETS
A. The U.S. Real Estate Capital Markets
The present real estate capital markets in the U.S. have
succeeded in integrating the markets, i.e., developing a close
relationship with the stock and bond markets. The original
reasons that necessitated this integration are as follows:
1. The requirement to diversify fund-raising resources on
the part of S&Ls in the residential mortgage market. This
arose from disintermediation and the yield curve squeeze.
2. The preference for cheaper, stabler and larger
amounts of funds in the commercial mortgage and equity
markets. This preference was caused by the increasing sizes
of properties and rising costs of interest.
Because of the diversity of the participants in the U.S.
financial markets, the needs and preferences vary according to
the market. Nonetheless, the market forces outlined above
resulted in the emergence of securitization. The essence of
securitization in real estate is structuring each transaction
in order to provide alternatives for the numerous investors in
the existing stock and bond markets as well as for the
borrowers in the real estate market. The alternatives for the
investor should be supported by rating, credit support and
professional management; consequently, there should be safer
and higher yields. The alternatives for the borrower should
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be cheaper, stabler and quicker fund-raising. The efforts to
structure each financial transaction finally succeeded in
creating a bridge between real estate capital markets and
other capital markets.
At the same time, it cannot be denied that this bridge
also works to transfer the price volatility in the stock and
bond markets to the real estate capital markets.
Finally, it should be noted that, in the U.S., the
integration of the real estate capital markets is based on the
already existing stock and bond markets with their full range
of diversity. In other words, the ability of the markets to
circulate real-estate-related securities as stocks and bonds
already existed.
B. Japanese Real Estate Capital Markets
Compared to the U.S., the concept of real estate capital
markets in Japan is still unclear. This is because these
markets are almost entirely controlled by the banks. Up to
now, in effect, bank loans alone have been sufficient to
supply long-term stable funds to the real estate industry.
The Japanese financial markets are rather unified and
homogeneous insofar as their participants are concerned. On
the one hand, the short-term financial institutions lend long-
term, and, on the other, the long-term financial institutions
lend short-term. This means that the long-term loan market
for real estate investment is very wide and full. The fact
that most of the real estate companies covered in Exhibit 8
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could obtain bank loans with more than 30% of total assets
indicates this reliable situation.
From another standpoint, it is also true that securities
markets, including the stock and bond markets, are not so
often used as fund-raising resources. This is partly because
the government deficit was not very large until recently. The
government only became a net borrower in 1977, and, until that
time, it did not have to develop the bond market to circulate
government bonds. Thus, the long-term bond market is still
somewhat immature.
Neither has the stock market developed very well. This
is because the basic financial system, led by the banks, is
characterized by relationship banking, which is, in turn,
based upon the close relationship between banks and companies.
This relationship tends to discourage the issuance of new
stocks because such an issuance is likely to weaken the ties
that bind the two institutions. The issuance of stock is used
to confirm the close relationship; this is evident in the fact
that, in 1985, institutional investors held 74.6% of all the
stocks in Japan, as opposed to around 30% in recent years in
the U.S. As a result, the stock market as a funding source is
still tightly regulated with, for example, strict criteria for
issuing stock, and, for most companies, except for the very
largest, it is very difficult to gain access to this market.
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C. Market Forces for Innovation in the Japanese Real Estate
Capital Markets
The large market force that the Japanese real estate
capital markets as well as capital markets are facing at
present is the trend to deregulation. This trend in Japan is
slightly slower than that in the U.S., proceeding gradually.
Interest rate regulation, in particular, is to be noted.
Different from the U.S., the role of the governmental Postal
Saving System (PSS) is strong. The PSS can insist that the
government allow it to give higher interest rates to its
depositors than the banks can offer because PSS funds are used
for public investment. Because of this problem between the
PSS and the banks, deregulation of interest rates will not
occur very soon. However, interest rate regulation has
certainly begun to show signs of collapse. For example,
interest rates on the Certificate Deposit (CD), Money Market
Certificate (MMC), and large-volume time deposit have already
been deregulated, and complete deregulation is not far in the
future. The deregulation of interest rates might affect the
stable flow of funds into the real estate capital markets.
The main issue is how the real estate capital markets can
obtain long-term, fixed-rate capital. Responding to the
deregulation of interest rates, Japanese banks would lend
money with short-term and floating rates as the S&Ls in the
U.S. initially did in reaction to the deregulation of interest
rates there.
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Because the financial institutions in Japan are unified,
as observed in Chapter II, the influence of any deregulation
of interest rates might be more significant than in the U.S.,
where the financial world is full of heterogeneity.
With such a potential market force ahead, it is
noteworthy for Japanese markets that the U.S. real estate
capital markets succeeded in obtaining capital through
securitization.
At the moment in Japan, however, there is no significant
device that can offer the investor small units and full
liquidity when investing in real estate. Direct investment in
real estate requires a huge amount of capital and is, thus,
out of the reach of small investors. To satisfy a need to
diversify investment devises in the capital markets,
securitization, as in the U.S., should be considered.
As outlined above, the need to create a bridge between
real estate and other capital markets appears to be rather
strong in present-day Japan. This need can also be met by
securitization.
D. REITs
In the U.S., the REIT industry has had its failures in
the past. The current resurgence in the performance of REITs
has not yet been proved completely reliable, and REITs still
have such disadvantages as not being able to reinvest from its
owned capital.
On the other hand, it is also true that REITs survived
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the recession period of the 1970's and resurged in spite of
it. As a result of this experience, REITs made major changes
in their management policies, and their present performance is
judged to be good.
Although a final evaluation of the REIT industry will
require more time, it can be said that it is in better shape
than it was in the past. REITs have assuredly tied the U.S.
real estate capital markets with other capital markets.
Further, in considering the essence of REITs, it should
be noted that they introduce price volatility into the real
estate capital markets, and there is no significant protection
against an excessive flow of funds that would overpower the
capacity of the real estate industry to invest and manage real
estate development project.
E. The Potential Adoption of REITs by Japanese Real Estate
Capital Markets
1. Interest on the Part of Related Parties in Japan
In this section, the interest by related parties in the
adoption of REITs are examined from the standpoints of
borrowers, investors and intermediaries.
a. Interest by borrowers
In terms of fund-raising at present, because big
companies, as mentioned above, have already set up strong
relationships with banks and have established fund-raising
methods through them, they are not particularly motivated to
adopt REITs. Additionally, they can approach the stock and
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bond markets directly because their past experience and past
reputation allow them that access. Thus, they have diversity
in fund-raising. The real necessity lies in those companies
and business that have no such access. The smaller companies
need potential alternatives in fund resources in order to
reduce the cost of borrowing. At present, these alternatives
are quite limited, i.e., to bank loans only.
In terms of funding after deregulation, both large and
small companies need diversity in fund-raising, as outlined
above. REITs would allow these companies to raise funds in
the capital markets so long as they are able to prepare
potentially qualified real estate development projects. REITs
make it possible to structure the fund-raising transaction
based on the potential profit of the project rather than on
the reputation or name of the company.
On the other hand, there is still doubt as to the
applicability of REITs. One reason is that potentially
profitable REITs may be able to offer better rates than the
banks. The other reason is that future development of the
securities markets themselves without REITs may provide access
for small investors to the capital markets. Furthermore, it
is very doubtful that the deep tradition of relationship
banking would accept funding that is not based on the name or
reputation of the company, but on the potential project
itself.
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b. Interest by investors
From the standpoint of individual investors, REITs are
promising because the shares are small enough for them. Up to
now, most individual investors have not been able to invest in
real estate because of the excessively high prices of such an
asset. REITs' shares would provide a way for them to invest
in real estate that is managed by professionals.
However, as an alternative investment device, REITs are
not at all promising in terms of return. In Tokyo, where the
land prices are extremely high, the rate of return on direct
real estate investment is usually around 2% with income gain
only and about 4% including the capital gain [118]. Assuming
potential Japanese REITs follow this performance in the
future, it can not be considered a promising investment
alternative compared to stocks, bonds or to real estate
investment overseas (For reference, see Exhibit 15).
Furthermore, this probable rate of return on REITs is not
competitive with that of real estate investment in the U.S.,
which is normally around 10%. Thus, it will be difficult to
attract capital now invested in the U.S. back to the domestic
market. Currently, direct real estate investment within the
Japanese market does not arise, as the above would indicate,
from anticipation of a good rate of return; rather it seems
that there are other incentives, such as the status or
pleasure involved in real estate ownership, as well as tax
incentives. Consequently, it is not likely that the Japanese
EXHIBIT 15
Security Investment Trusts (SITs)
Performance Comparison
(September 1987)
6 mouth 1 year 3year 5year
12.5%
23.3%
-2.4%
3.2%
14.8%
-1.8%
17.3%
41.6%
7.3%
11.2%
18.2%
1.3%
7.4%
27.5%
2.4%
5.5%
27.0%
2.8%
21.2%
32.0%
11. 1%
0.5%
62.3%
-8.5%
29.6%
89.3%
20.8%
5.2%
10.8%
-3.7%
Open-ended, Growth Type
(Sample # 15)
Weighted Average *
Maximum
Minimum
Open-ended, Large Stock Type
(Sample # 5)
Weighted Average *
Maximum
Minimum
Closed, Growth Type
(Sample # 7)
Weighted Average **
Maximum
Minimum
Closed-end, Large Stock Type
(Sample # 13)
Weighted Average **
Maximum
Minimum
[SITs]
12.9%
20.3%
7.5%
[Stock Index]
Nikkei 225 Average
Nikkei 500 Average
TOPIX ***
TSESA ****
20.6% 45.7% 144.5% 276.4%
24.5% 37.6% 83.1% 215.2%
14.2% 40.8% 159.7% 307.8%
29.8% 44.5% 104.0% 244.7%
(Note) * Weighted Average of Net Assets
** Weighted Average of Residual Principal
* Tokyo Stock Exchange Price Index
**** Tokyo Stock Exchange Simple Average
(Source: Weekly Diamond, April 2.1988)
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36.8%
16.1%
32.8%
67.5%
119.0%
50.1%
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investor would show a strong interest in REITs because of
their uncompetitive rate of return.
c. Interest by intermediaries
It is doubtful that Japanese financial intermediaries,
which are now dominant in the real estate capital markets
there, need REITs, which would be highly competitive with the
existence of financial institutions. For long-term financial
institutions in particular, REITs could even be considered
dangerous because REIT shares might replace their debentures,
and the asset allocation of REITs might replace their loans.
2. Security Investment Trusts (SITs) in Japan--Potential
Japanese REITs
In looking at the reality of a possible adoption of REITs
by Japanese real estate capital markets, it will be useful to
examine the existing Security Investment Trusts (SITs) in
Japan.
SITs are investment trusts that invest exclusively in
securities and can be explained as follows. A small investor
who lacks the ability to manage stocks or bonds entrusts funds
to an investment specialist to obtain a higher return. The
specialists, the trustees, in turn, manage the raised funds in
stocks and bonds.
The outstanding balance of SITs in 1987 was 429,144
million yen, and, in the 1982-1987 period, the outstandings
increased by more than four times because of stock price
increases.
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SITs in the Japanese securities markets are similar in
function to REITs in the U.S. real estate capital markets.
The following differences, however, should be noted.
a. Legal structure
The most important difference is that SITs are operated
by a SIT company, which is not tax-exempt. Originally, SITs
were created to open the investment opportunities for small
and inexperienced investors, not to diversify fund resources
for the capital markets by-incorporating a tax-exempt status.
Considering the significance of REIT's tax-exempt status, this
aspect of SITs would probably become the largest stumbling
block in REIT's adoption to Japan.
In addition to this, it is very difficult for SITs
themselves to issue stocks or bonds because, as they are
presently constructed, SITs are not a legal entity, but one
kind of financial offering made by a SIT company. In Japan,
as we have mentioned, in order to issue stocks or bonds,
several requirements must be met. Thus, it is very probable
that potential Japanese REITs would be different from their
U.S. counterparts in capital structure.
b. Object of the investment
SIT investments are limited to securities defined in the
Securities and Exchange Law. Real-estate-related securities
such as mortgage securities are completely excluded from this
category.
In order to modify SITs to REITs in Japan, expansion of
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the objects of investment will be required. This, however,
will not be sufficient because a secondary market for real-
estate-related securities, such as mortgage securities, will
be necessary to assure their free circulation.
c. Independence of management
The management of SITs is not so independent from the
parent company as are REITs from their advisor. Most Japanese
SITs have been established by securities companies because
permission to establish a SIT company is based on the selling
power of SIT shares in the past. Once it has been
established, a SIT company continues to depend on the sales
power of the parent company. Consequently, about 90% of the
securities issued by SITs in 1987 were sold by their parent
companies.
It is said that the Securities Exchange Committee in the
U.S. considers a Japanese SIT company to be a subsidiary of
its securities company, not an affiliate, because the
composition of the executives and the stockholders is almost
the same as that of the parent company [16]. This close
relationship restricts the management of SITs.
d. Performance
The performance of SITs at the moment is quite low
(Exhibit 15), not even exceeding the performance of several
stock indexes. This is because the management of SITs is
strongly influenced by the policy of the parent securities
company. An additional reason is the incomplete disclosure
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system. At present, the performance disclosure of SITs
depends on the private association that has been established
by the SIT industry, and there is no reliable third-party
evaluation. In addition, the disclosure method of SITs is
fairly complicated, making it hard for the amateur to compare
one SIT with another. Consequently, management within the SIT
industry lacks the incentive to improve their performance.
e. Potential of SITs to develop into the Japanese REITs
From the above discussion, it seems that simple expansion
of the objects of investment of SITs will not create Japanese
REITs. REITs are an entity backed by the U.S. financial
markets, which have complete stock and bond markets at their
disposal. The fundamental concept of SITs is quite different
from REITs in that the former are not a single independent
entity that can issue stocks or bonds as REITs in the U.S. do.
F. Japanese Arguments for the Adoption of REITs
Presently, some concerned parties in Japan believe that
equity REITs should be adopted into the Japanese real estate
capital markets fairly soon [541 [118]. Let us examine their
arguments in this section.
Argument 1 -- "Because REITs are highly liquid, a quality
lacked by traditional direct real estate investment, the
investor who expects return from real estate ownership would
buy REIT shares. Consequently, REITs would reduce the demand
for direct real estate ownership" [114) [118].
Although REIT shares are liquid, this characteristic is
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likely to provoke price volatility in REIT shares, as
discussed in Chapter III. Furthermore, even if there were a
strong demand for REIT shares, there would still be a strong
demand for direct real estate ownership, as the motivations
for owning one or the other are quite different.
Argument 2 -- "Equity REITs should be adopted. Equity
REITs are superior to mortgage REITs in that they can
distribute the capital gain as well as the income gain" [118].
As mentioned in Chapter III, studies in the past show
better performance and smaller risks with equity REITs than
with mortgage REITs. However, the return of REITs compared to
other investments does not seem to be competitive with other
alternatives, as already pointed out. And it has been noted
that traditional direct investment in domestic real estate is
greatly sustained by the social status or pleasure involved.
REIT shares would not provide such indirect benefits.
Argument 3 -- "Japanese equity REITs should invest only
in construction and development projects. The resale of
existing buildings or inventory land without adding any value
should be prohibited in order to prevent the speculation that
is so rampant in the present-day real estate markets. If
Japanese equity REITs could only invest in construction and
development, this would help increase the new supply of real
estate" [118].
It would be rather difficult for REITs, even equity
REITs, to concentrate on construction and development. The
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reason is that this phase of a project is far more risky than
the holding period. The U.S. experience tells us that most of
the REITs that concentrated on this type of investment
collapsed. Although investment in the construction and
development phase increases the rate of return, concentration
on it is essentially risky and increases the volatility of the
investment.
Argument 4 -- "REITs provide investment opportunities for
the smaller investor who cannot afford to invest directly in
real estate. This would reduce the social inequality caused
by high land prices" [54] [118].
This argument alone seems appropriate because it is true
that REITs were originally established for the small
investors. But by itself does not make a sufficiently strong
case to adopt REITs to the Japanese real estate capital
markets.
G. Conclusion
The author would like to summarize this thesis and the
chapter as follows.
1. Present-day U.S. real estate capital markets have
succeeded in integration, i.e., in establishing a bridge
between the real estate capital markets and the stock and bond
markets, through securitization. The securitization of real
estate can be said to be an effort to create alternatives for
the investor as well as the borrower. This type of
instrument, however, carries with it the risk of transferring
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the price volatility of the security directly to the real
estate.
2. Present-day Japanese real estate capital markets, on
the other hand, are solely controlled by bank loans and have
not developed a bridge to other capital markets. This
situation can be explained by the developed and flexible bank
loan market and the less-developed stock and bond markets.
3. Japanese real estate capital markets are attracted by
securitization, i.e., they wish to establish access to other
capital markets. This interest is derived from market forces,
the likelihood of bank deregulation, and the very poor ability
of small companies to obtain bank financing.
4. REITs, as legislated in the U.S., were successful in
bridging the capital markets. In the U.S., REITs survived the
recession and to some extent established their long-term
status as a fund-raising instrument as well as an investment
alternative for the small investor.
5. In Japanese real estate capital markets, in terms of
interest on the part of related parties at present, there is
no evidence of the necessity to adopt REITs, although there is
some need to diversify fund-raising options to more than just
bank loans. But this need to diversify does not necessarily
imply the adoption of REITs. REITs require, as a fundamental
basis, the full development of the securities markets.
Although there is a close relationship between the need for
fund-raising diversification and the development of the
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securities markets, the author could not find any reason to
tie the need for diversification of fund-raising to the
adoption of REITs.
6. There is a great difference between the concept of
SITs in Japan and REITs in the U.S. The simple expansion of
the objects of investment of SITs will not, in itself, promise
the development of SITs into REITs.
7. The author concludes that the applicability of REITs
to present-day Japanese real estate capital markets is low,
although the need for the Japanese real estate capital markets
to create some sort of bridge to other capital markets is
perceived.
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